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The Redefinition of the Official Monetary
Aggregates
by Henry C. Wallich* and Warren T. Trepeta**
I. INTRODUCTION
THE FULL EMPLOYMENT and Balanced Growth Act of 1978
requires the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System to
state to the Congress twice annually: (1) its "objectives with respect to
ranges of growth of the monetary and credit aggregates ... taking ac-
count of past and prospective developments in employment, unemploy-
ment, production, investment, real income, productivity, international
trade and payments, and prices";1 and (2) the relationship of those objec-
tives to the short-term goals of the President and Congress.2 The Act is
silent on the definition of the monetary and credit aggregates. The Fed-
eral Reserve System is free, therefore, to select definitions that it consid-
ers most appropriate.
The Federal Reserve System announced new definitions of the mone-
tary aggregates on February 7, 1980. The next section of this article re-
views the financial developments that motivated this redefinition. Section
II sets forth the principles and goals that guided the design of the new
aggregates. Section IV evaluates the new monetary measures in terms of
the criteria described in Section III. Section V contains concluding
remarks.
II. FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENTS IN THE 1970's AND THE NEED FOR
REDEFINITION
Much of the monetary literature holds that the volume of money and
the levels of aggregate income and prices are interdependent because
money serves in unique ways to facilitate economic transactions. This
* Member, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.
** Economist, Banking Section, Division of Research and Statistics, Board of Gover-
nors of the Federal Reserve System.
The authors wish to thank Thomas D. Simpson, David E. Lindsey, Thomas F. Brady,
Edward C. Ettin, and Perry D. Quick for helpful comments on earlier drafts of this article.
Although the authors have benefited greatly from research conducted by the Board staff,
the opinions expressed herein do not necessarily represent the views of the Board of Gover-
nors of the Federal Reserve System or its staff.
1 12 U.S.C. § 225a (Supp. 1978).
2 Id.
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literature suggests several functional distinctions between money and
other goods. According to one view, money consists of "media of ex-
change" or "transactions balances"-that is, assets, such as currency and
demand deposits, that are immediately available and commonly
presented as payment for goods and services. Alternatively, money has
been defined more broadly to include all "temporary abodes of purchas-
ing power"-that is, both media of exchange and other assets that by
virtue of relatively easy, inexpensive convertibility into a medium of ex-
change are held between receipt and disbursement of income. There ex-
ists a hierarchy of such assets, distinguished by maturity, cost of liquida-
tion, and risk of change in value between purchase and resale.
Until the last decade, the official definitions of money appeared to
correspond rather closely to the theoretical concepts of money. The for-
mer aggregates included all principal media of exchange and most tempo-
rary abodes of purchasing power, arranged in an acceptable hierarchy.
Moreover, there existed a rather close and stable relationship between
growth in the official measures of money and growth of GNP and related
variables of ultimate interest to the Federal Reserve.
In mid-1974, however, the public's demand for money as officially
measured-especially transactions balances-began to fall short of the
demand that would have been consistent with the historical relation of
money demand to GNP and interest rates. Viewed alternatively, the in-
come velocity of money (i.e., the ratio of GNP to the official money
stock) grew at a rate faster than that implied by the historical relation
between velocity and interest rates. The downward shift in money de-
mand was most pronounced at nonfinancial corporations and resulted
largely, it appears, from technological change. Specifically, many corpora-
tions reduced their need for transactions balances by using computers,
advanced statistical methods, and other devices to stabilize cash flow, to
monitor it more closely, and to forecast it more reliably. Improvements in
cash management practices would have argued only for adjustment of the
System's target ranges for growth of the monetary aggregates, and would
not have made redefinition of the aggregates desirable, if firms had di-
verted funds from transactions balances to less liquid assets included in
the broader official aggregates. However, firms increased their reliance on
other assets as temporary abodes of purchasing power. Consumers also
began to substitute new financial assets, such as money market mutual
funds, for those included in the official measures of money. These devel-
opments, together with a variety of changes in the functional characteris-
tics of assets included in the official aggregates, motivated redefinition.
The acceleration of inflation during the 1970's tended to invoke
change in financial markets. An obvious and natural change was a rise in
most interest rates as lenders demanded compensation for prospective de-
clines in the purchasing power of their funds and borrowers perceived
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their ability to pay higher interest rates to be enhanced by the prospect
of continued rapid inflation. Legislation and regulation governing deposi-
tory institutions tended to inhibit some forms of adaptation to acceler-
ated inflation, such as increases in interest rates paid on deposits. Gov-
ernmental restrictions at that time encouraged, instead, the appearance
and rapid growth of new financial instruments and change in the services
provided by existing assets.$
For example, in the absence of legal restraint, banks probably would
have offered a greater interest return on demand deposits as other inter-
est rates increased. A federal statute, however, prohibits the payment of
interest on demand deposits. 4 This limitation on the benefits of holding
demand deposits encourages the public to shift funds from demand ac-
counts to interest-bearing assets when interest rates increase. During the
1970's, the prospect of continued rapid inflation and concomitant high in-
terest rates prompted unusual efforts by the public to economize on hold-
ings of demand deposits. This prospect also caused financial institutions
to offer new cash management services and interest-bearing accounts
readily usable to finance transactions. For instance, as mentioned earlier,
firms adopted new cash management techniques in order to trim cash
holdings. With the aid of piecemeal relaxation of some regulatory con-
straints, consumers acquired the ability to- preauthorize bill payments out
of interest-bearing savings accounts; to transfer savings balances by draft
and telephone; and, most recently, to have savings balances transferred
automatically to checking accounts as checks clear. In addition, invest-
ment companies introduced money market mutual funds bearing both
market rates of interest and check-writing features.
Regulatory ceilings on interest rates on savings and small time depos-
Competition among financial institutions for funds might have produced some change
in the characteristics of assets and new financial services, even in the absence of more rapid
inflation, higher interest rates, and governmental restraints. The latter factors, however,
greatly enhanced incentives for financial innovation.
4 The Banking Act of 1933 added paragraphs 9 and 10 to section 19 of the Federal
Reserve Act. Paragraph 9 provides that no bank belonging to the Federal Reserve System
shall "directly or indirectly, by any device whatsoever, pay any interest on any deposit
which is payable on demand." Paragraph 10 directed the Federal Reserve to limit from time
to time the rates of interest payable on time and savings deposits at banks belonging to the
System. The Banking Act of 1935 extended these provisions to other banks insured by the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC). For a review of the arguments advanced by
the original proponents of these restrictions, see Linke, The Evaluation of Interest Rate
Regulation on Commercial Bank Deposits in the United States, NAT'L BANKING REV. (June
1966).
The prohibition of interest on demand deposits has been only partially effective. Banks
do pay some implicit interest in the form of charges below costs for services provided to
owners of demand accounts. See Axilrod et al., The Impact of the Payment of Interest on
Demand Deposits 19-25 (Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Jan. 1977,
unpublished.)
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its at commercial banks and thrift institutions prevented a rise in such
rates commensurate with the increase in unregulated rates.5 Conse-
quently, banks and thrifts endeavored to increase the return on savings
accounts by providing to savers gifts and additional services, such as the
new means of transferring savings balances discussed above. Regulatory
ceilings provided an incentive to savers to purchase shares in money mar-
ket mutual funds and other assets bearing interest rates determined in
the credit markets.
Growth of monetary assets not contained in the former official aggre-
gates was stimulated further by the absence of interest payments on cash
balances held by member banks to satisfy reserve requirements.8 When a
member bank issues another dollar's worth of a liability, reserve require-
ments in effect impose a tax on that dollar equal to the interest foregone
on the additional reserve balances that the member must hold against the
new liability. The size of this tax increased as market interest rates rose
during the 1970's. As a result, member banks faced a growing incentive to
" Pub. L. No. 89-597 authorized the Federal Home Loan Bank Board and the FDIC to
set maximum interest rates payable on small time and savings deposits at federally insured
savings and loan associations and mutual savings banks. The law also directed these agen-
cies and the Federal Reserve to consult with each other when setting ceilings on interest
rates. This provision was intended to offset thrift institutions' inability to pay competitive
interest rates on deposits in periods of cyclically high interest rates-a disadvantage im-
posed on thrifts by other legislation, which restricted the assets that they could hold mainly
to long-term, fixed-rate mortgages. Pursuant to Pub. L. No. 89-597 and subsequent renew-
als, the regulatory agencies have maintained a coordinated structure of deposit interest rate
ceilings based on the maximum rates that thrift institutions could afford to pay, given their
portfolio returns. Although these ceilings have helped thrifts to maintain their share of
small time and savings deposits relative to commercial banks, they have encouraged savers
to divert funds from all depository institutions-from banks as well as thrifts-to financial
instruments bearing market-determined interest rates, during periods of cyclically high mar-
ket rates. For further discussion, see Teeters, Removal of Deposit Interest Rate Ceilings
Would Stabilize Deposit Flows, AM. BANKER (Aug. 13, 1979).
Recognizing this disadvantage of deposit interest rate ceilings, Congress provided for
their phase-out in Title II of the Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Con-
trol Act of 1980 (Pub. L. No. 96-221). Specifically, Congress transferred authority to set
ceiling rates to the Depository Institutions Deregulation Committee, consisting of the Secre-
tary of the Treasury, the chairmen of the governing boards of the Federal Reserve, the
Federal Home Loan Bank System, the FDIC, and the National Credit Union Administra-
tion-all voting members of the Committee-and the Comptroller of the Currency-a non-
voting member. Congress directed the Committee to increase ceiling rates to market interest
rate levels as soon as possible, giving due regard to the financial viability of depository insti-
tutions. The Act provides for complete elimination of the ceilings six years after enactment.
In addition, Title IV of the Act liberalizes the asset powers of thrift institutions to enable
them after an adjustment period to pay competitive interest rates on deposits.
I The term "member banks" refers to commercial banks that belong to the Federal
Reserve System. Member banks are required to hold stipulated fractions of certain liabili-
ties as either cash in their vaults or deposits at Federal Reserve Banks. Reserve require-
ments vary by type of liability and by the size of the bank issuing the liability. The Federal
Reserve sets reserve requirements within limits specified by statute.
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reduce required reserves by issuing liabilities that were either free of re-
serve requirements or subject to relatively low requirements. Some of
those liabilities were not included in the former aggregates. In addition,
the increase in the cost that reserve requirements imposed on member
banks depressed the interest rates that members could afford to pay on
their reservable liabilities relative to rates paid by financial institutions
abroad-including members' foreign branches-which are not subject to
similar reserve requirements. In this way, reserve requirements enhanced
demand for Eurodollar deposits, which may be held for expenditure in
the United States, but were excluded from the former measures of the
U.S. money supply.
7
III. CRITERIA UNDERLYING THE NEW DEFINITIONS
A. Theoretical Considerations.
The functional distinctions between media of exchange, temporary
abodes of purchasing power, and other assets have guided the construc-
tion of new measures of the money supply. The new monetary definitions
specify a hierarchy of aggregates, starting with transactions balances and
gradually adding less liquid assets to produce several broader measures.
Functional guidelines can be difficult to apply because in some cases
an asset's principal function is not obvious. For example, an account with
a money market mutual fund may serve as a transactions balance, a
short-term store of value, or a long-term investment designed to conserve
wealth and to earn interest income for expenditure in the distant future.
In some cases, the extent to which an asset is used to facilitate transac-
tions in the near term can be inferred from its turnover rate, defined as
the ratio of (1) total debits made against a type of account in a given
period to (2) the volume of funds held in that type of account on average
over the same period. High turnover indicates that new funds deposited
to the account in question are quickly used in transactions.
While economists emphasize different functional distinctions be-
tween money and other goods, they generally agree on several principles
of aggregation. First, aggregates should group all assets that the public
views as similar in function, regardless of the type of institution that is-
sued them. A related second principle holds that aggregates that are used
to influence domestic economic activity should include assets held to
finance domestic expenditure, whether held in domestic or foreign insti-
tutions. Third, an aggregate should exclude assets that are held to back or
to service other assets included in the aggregate. Otherwise, the aggregate
will overstate the volume of funds held for the purchase of goods and
services. For example, an aggregate that includes the public's demand de-
7 Eurodollar deposits are dollar-denominated deposits at commercial bank offices
outside the United States.
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posits should exclude demand deposits held by banks at other banks to
service demand deposit liabilities to the nonbank public.
In addition to the foregoing principles of aggregation, some econo-
mists advocate the measurement of monetary subtotals held by individual
sectors of the economy (e.g., households, government, business), as well as
the combined holdings of these sectors. Advocates of such "disaggrega-
tion" suggest that sectoral subtotals of money would yield additional in-
formation about the economy, because it appears that individuals and
different types of institution respond to different needs and opportunities
in acquiring and disposing of monetary assets.
B. Policy Considerations.
1. Demand Properties and Income Velocity.
If the Federal Reserve is to exert a predictable influence on GNP by
controlling the supply of an aggregate, then the public's demand for that
aggregate should ideally have two important properties. First, demand
should be rather insensitive to factors-other than GNP-that are diffi-
cult to predict. Second, the relationship between demand for an official
aggregate and its determinants should be stable over time. If demand for
an aggregate lacks these properties, then it will be difficult to predict the
income velocity of the aggregate or, in other terms, the level of GNP that
will be associated with a given supply of the aggregate. Consequently,
growth of the aggregate within given target ranges will often be accompa-
nied by growth of GNP different from that desired.
Econometric techniques can be applied to historical data to yield es-
timates of the relation between demand for an aggregate and its determi-
nants and of the correlation between changes in GNP and current and
past changes in the aggregate. The properties of estimated relationships
may indicate the prospective usefulness of aggregates for policy. After a
period of considerable financial innovation such as the 1970's, however,
econometric estimates based on historical experience may give little indi-
cation of the future properties of aggregates and should, therefore, be
used with caution. It seems probable that an aggregate carefully selected
on the basis of current and prospective functional similarities among its
components will exhibit better empirical properties in the future than an
aggregate that has shown better empirical properties in the past, but is
now faulty on functional grounds.
The relationship between the monetary aggregates and income gener-
ally reflects a two-way causation, with each influencing the other. By ana-
lytical and econometric means, it is possible, within rather wide limits, to
establish which of the two causal influences dominates in the relationship
between a particular monetary aggregate and income. If "reverse causa-
tion" is strong-that is, if the influence of income on the aggregate is the
dominant factor in the relationship between the two-the aggregate is
less useful as a target for monetary policy.
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2. Controllability.
If an aggregate is to play a central role in the conduct of monetary
policy, its size and rate of growth should depend predictably on tools
under the Federal Reserve System's direct control. The System's tools
include reserve requirements imposed on member banks and other insti-
tutions, open market operations, and the terms of "discount window"
loans made by the System.8
Ih many cases, it is difficult to discriminate among aggregates on the
basis of prospective controllability. However, it is clear that Eurodollars,
which are issued by institutions regulated by foreign governments, and
very broad aggregates containing a large volume of nonreservable compo-
nents, such as total debt,. will continue to be relatively difficult to control.
3. Availability of Data.
The cost and quality of data needed to measure alternative aggre-
gates have influenced the selection of new official totals somewhat. The
monetary authorities, as well as private decision-makers, require mea-
sures of the official aggregates that are both accurate and fairly up to
date, in order to make correct and timely decisions. In addition, it is de-
sirable to have historical data on most of the components of an aggregate;
such data are needed both for the estimation of statistical relationships
for use in forecasting, and for the identification of regular, seasonal move-
ments in the aggregate, as opposed to cyclical changes and secular trends.
IV. THE NE W AGGREGATES
Tables 1 and 2 display the new and old definitions of the official
monetary aggregates, respectively, and the magnitudes of their compo-
8 The Federal Reserve imposes reserve requirements not only on member banks, but
also on Edge Act Corporations. It is in the process of establishing reserve requirements for
United States branches and agencies of foreign banks having worldwide assets over $1 bil-
lion-as authorized by the International Banking Act of 1978 (Pub. L. No. 95-369)-and for
other nonmember depository institutions-as authorized by Title I of the Depository Insti-
tutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980 (Pub. L. No. 96-221). Reserve re-
quirements influence both the composition and the total volume of subject institutions' lia-
bilities, given the supply of reserves. Open market operations involve System purchases and
sales of securities, which respectively increase and reduce the supply of reserves. The Sys-
tem also lends reserves to its members; the volume of such loans responds to the relation
between the interest rate they bear-termed the "discount" rate-and the cost of funds
from other sources, as well as to informal guidelines regarding the appropriate size and fre-
quency of loans to individual institutions.
1980
CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L.
nents as of November 1979. The new aggregates M-1A and M-1B are var-
iants of the narrow medium of exchange, or transactions balance, concept
of money, formerly represented by M-1. The new aggregates M-2, M-3,
and L, which replace the old M-3 through M-7,9 incorporate both transac-
tions balances and successively broader totals of liquid assets that may
serve as temporary abodes of purchasing power. This section discusses
arguments for and against the treatment accorded individual assets under
the new definitions.
Table 110
The New Monetary Aggregates
Amount in billions
of dollars
(not seasonally adjusted)
Aggregate Component November 1979
M-1A 372.2
Currency 106.6
Demand deposits"l 265.6
M-1B 387.8
M-1A 372.2
Other checkable deposits 15.7
M-2 1509.9
M-1B 387.8
Overnight and continuing contract RPs issued by
commercial banks 20.3
Overnight Eurodollar deposits held by U.S. nonbank
residents at Caribbean branches of member banks 3.2
Money market mutual fund shares 40.4
Only the old M-1 through M-5 were published.
10 This table is an updated version of a table which appeared in The Redefined Mone-
tary Aggregates, FED. RES. BULL. 97-114 (Feb. 1980). Components of M-2, M-3 and L gener-
ally exclude amounts held by domestic depository institutions, foreign commercial banks
and official institutions, the United States Government (including the Federal Reserve), and
money market mutual funds. Exceptions are bankers acceptances and commercial paper, for
which data sources permit the removal only of amounts held by money market mutual
funds and, in the case of bankers acceptances, amounts held by accepting banks, the Fed-
eral Reserve, and the Federal Home Loan Bank System.
"1 Net of demand deposits due to foreign commercial banks and official institutions.
12 Includes NOW, ATS and credit union share draft balances and demand deposits at
thrift institutions.
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Ordinary savings deposits at all depository institutions 420.0
Small time deposits at all depository institutions1 s  640.8
M-2 consolidation components 14  -2.6
M-3 1759.1
M-2 1509.9
Large time deposits at all depository institutions' 5  219.5
Term RPs issued by commercial banks 21.5
RPs issued by savings and loan associations 8.2
L ( 2122.7
M-3 1759.1
Other Eurodollars held by U.S. nonbank residents 34.0
Bankers acceptances 27.6
Commercial paper 97.1
Savings bonds 80.3
Liquid Treasury obligations 124.7
Table 2
The Old Monetary Aggregates
Amount in billions
of dollars
(not seasonally adjusted)
Aggregate Component November 1979
M-1 382.6
Currency 106.6
Demand deposits16  276.0
M-2 945.3
M-1 382.6
Savings deposits at commercial banks 17 207.3
Small time deposits at commercial banks 239.3
Large time deposits at commercial banks other than
negotiable CDs at large banks 116.1
M-3 1609.5
M-2 945.3
Savings balances at thrift institutions" , Is 227.1
Small time deposits at thrift institutions 407.6
Large time deposits at thrift institutions 29.5
'3 Time deposits issued in denominations of less than $100,000.
11 In order to avoid double counting of some deposits in M-2, those demand deposits
owned by thrift institutions (a component of M-1B) that are estimated to be used for servic-
ing their savings and small time deposit liabilities in M-2 are removed.
' Time deposits issued in denominations of $100,000 or more.
'6 Includes demand deposits due to foreign commercial banks and official institutions.
Does not include $1 billion of demand deposits at mutual savings banks, which were not
contained in any of the old aggregates.
17 Includes NOW and ATS balances at these institutions.
13 Includes credit union sharedraft balances.
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M-4 1041.2
M-2 945.3
Negotiable CDs at large commercial banks 95.9
M-5 1705.4
M-3 1609.5
Negotiable CDs at large commercial banks 95.9
A. Sectoral Holdings.
The new monetary aggregates exclude deposits held in the United
States by foreign commercial banks and official institutions, as recom-
mended by the Advisory Committee on Monetary Statistics (the Bach
Committee).' 9 These deposits, which were part of the old aggregates, ap-
pear to be held primarily to finance operations in foreign exchange mar-
kets and to clear other international financial transactions, rather than to
finance the purchase of goods, services, and assets in the United States.20
The published components of both the new and the old aggregates
generally combine the monetary assets of households, firms, and state and
local governments. 2' Some evidence suggests that demands for money by
different sectors of the economy depend on different factors, and that cal-
culating separate measures of the money holdings of sectors-in addition
to aggregates-would yield further information about the economy and
better forecasts of total money demand.22 Data limitations and costs con-
tinue to preclude the publication of such disaggregated estimates of
money holdings. For example, it is impractical to directly measure hold-
ings of currency and marketable assets by sector. In addition, frequent
collection of timely data on sectoral holdings of other monetary assets
would entail considerable cost to private financial institutions for record-
keeping and reporting.
" IMPROVING THE MoNErARY AGGREGATES: REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON
MONETARY STATISTICS (Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, June 1976)
[hereinafter cited as the BACH COMMITTEE REPORT]. The Committee also endorsed the exclu-
sion of most deposits held by the federal government, on the grounds that (1) the United
States Treasury is part of the monetary authority and (2) the behavior of the federal gov-
ernment's demand for money differs from that of the public's demand. The new aggregates
exclude such deposits, as the old did.
10 Id. at 17-19, and Farr, Girton, Terrell, and Turner, Foreign Demand Deposits at
Commercial Banks in the United States, in IMPROVING THE MONETARY AGGREGATES: STAFF
PAPERS [hereinafter cited as STAFF PAPERS] 35-54 (Board of Governors of the Federal Re-
serve System, November 1978).
2' The FEDERAL RESERVE BULL. TABLE 1.32, does report quarterly estimates of sectoral
holdings of demand deposits. These estimates are based on data from a sample of banks.
22 See Farr, Porter and Pruitt, Demand Deposit Ownership Survey, in STAFF PAPERS
supra note 20, at 91-116, and Goldfeld, The Demand for Money Revisited, 3 BROOKINGS
PAPERS ON ECONOMIC ACTIVITY 577-638 (1973).
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B. Currency.
The volume of currency outstanding-over $500 per capita-is sur-
prisingly large, in light of casual observation of the typical currency needs
of firms and households. It would appear that a sizable portion of cur-
rency is either hoarded, lost, held by collectors, or held abroad for foreign
transactions and, thus, should in principle be excluded from the aggre-
gates because it is not used in payment for goods and services in the
United States.2 3 Measurement difficulties prevent such an exclusion, but
this will pose a problem only if measured currency grows at a rate sub-
stantially different from the rate of expansion of currency that is truly in
circulation in the U.S.24
Finally, both the new and old aggregates combine currency and de-
mand deposits because both serve as media of exchange and because ease
of converting currency into demand deposits, and vice versa, makes these
assets potentially good substitutes.25 However, demands for the two assets
have different properties; therefore, many large econometric models em-
ploy separate equations to predict these demands. 26 This procedure can
continue because the Federal Reserve will, as in the past, publish sepa-
rate measures of currency and demand deposits, in addition to the
aggregates. 7
23 Robert D. Laurent has estimated that currency lost, destroyed, or held by collectors
ranged from 2.5 to 4.5 percent of currency held outside the United States Treasury and
Federal Reserve Banks, during the period 1861-1971. See Laurent, Currency in Circulation
and the Real Value of Notes, J. OF MONEY, CRnrr, AND BANKING 213-226 (May 1974).
'" Gutmann has cited the large volume of currency and recent growth in the ratio of
currency to demand deposits as evidence of a large and growing underground economy that
is dependent on currency as a medium of exchange and store of value. See Gutmann, The
Subterranean Economy, FINANCIAL ANALYsTs J. 26-27 (Nov.-Dec. 1977). Several authors
have disputed this inference. See, for example, Garcia, The Currency Ratio and the Subter-
ranean Economy, FINANCIAL ANALYSTS J. 64-69 (Nov.-Dec. 1978) and Porter and Thurman,
The Currency Ratio and the Subterranean Economy: Additional Comments (Board of Gov-
ernors of the Federal Reserve System, Jan. 1979 unpublished). The possible existence of an
underground economy casts doubt on the validity of official GNP statistics, but poses a
problem for monetary policy only if changes in the ratio of underground activity to mea-
sured GNP generate unpredictable shifts in total demand for currency.
" Nevertheless, recent econometric estimates suggest that the public does not view cur-
rency and demand deposits as good substitutes. See E. K. Offenbacher, The Substitutability
of Monetary Assets (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Chicago, Dec. 1978.)
,0 Porter and Thurman, supra note 24, at 2.
7, A minor issue concerning the treatment of currency in measures of money involves
notes of large denomination ($500 and over). It has been argued that such notes are so ill
suited to most payments that they must serve primarily as a store of value and, therefore,
belong only in the broader aggregates. However, there is no hard evidence indicating that
the public uses this currency primarily as a store of value. Moreover, such notes constitute a
very small fraction of total currency and are declining in volume because they are no longer
issued. Therefore, it seems acceptable to continue to include them in the narrow aggregates.
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C. Demand Deposits.
Both the new and the old aggregates include all demand deposits at
commercial banks in the United States, with a few exceptions noted ear-
lier and in the discussion of consolidation below.2 s Some economists have
argued for the exclusion of compensating balances-that is, funds that
firms and individuals must hold in demand accounts in return for lines of
credit and other bank services-on the grounds that these balances do
not satisfy transactions needs, but, rather, lie idle. 9 However, compensat-
ing balance requirements for corporations, the principal holders of such
funds, are usually specified not as minima, but rather as daly averages
over periods as long as a month or a quarter. The balances of corpora-
tions, thus, can and do vary considerably around required averages.3 0 It
appears, then, that compensating balances do serve transactions needs
and, therefore, belong in the narrow aggregates.3'
D. Travelers Checks.
These assets are accepted as payment for goods and services. There-
fore, the medium-of-exchange criterion calls for a measure of transactions
balances that includes all travelers checks held for domestic spending. A
second-best approach is to include in the narrow aggregates all dollar-
denominated travelers checks issued in the U.S. The old aggregates in-
cluded travelers check liabilities of banks, but because of past data limi-
tations, they excluded nonbank travelers checks-those issued by hold-
ing company affiliates of banks or by nonbank firms, such as American
Express. The new money measures will include nonbank travelers checks
after all major nonbank issuers begin to submit data to the Federal Re-
serve on a regular basis.
2
28 The old aggregates excluded demand deposits at mutual savings banks (about $1
billion in November 1979). These demand deposits are now included in M-1B and broader
aggregates.
29 These balances compensate banks for services by providing banks with funds - at
no cost in terms of interest - which banks can then lend at interest.
30 Davis, Cash Management Practices, appendix to T. Simpson, The Market for Federal
Funds and RPs (Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System Staff Studies, July
1979, unpublished).
3' Theory supports this view. Given reserve requirements, a member bank can earn
interest on only part of a compensating balance. The owner of a compensating balance,
however, could lend the full amount at interest, keep some of the earnings, and use the rest
to pay his bank even more for services than the bank would earn on the balance. Thus, both
banks and customers would be better off to substitute explicit fees for the excess of compen-
sating balance requirements over customers' desired average transactions balances. Compe-
tition should guarantee that such substitution occurs in the long run.
32 Travelers checks issued by banks appear in bank records as officers' checks, a compo-
nent of the demand deposit figures published by the Federal Reserve. Rough estimates sug-
gest that $2.5 billion of nonbank travelers checks were outstanding in late 1978.
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E. NOW,3 3 ATS,3 4 and Credit Union Share Draft Balances.
At first glance, it would appear proper to include NOW, ATS, and
credit union share draft balances in the narrowest monetary aggregate
because drafts against these funds are generally accepted media of ex-
change.35 However, recent Federal Reserve estimates of turnover rates,
shown in Table 3, indicate that while NOW and ATS balances are much
more closely related to transactions needs than ordinary savings accounts,
they are much less so than consumer demand deposits. Partly in recogni-
tion of the hybrid nature of "checkable" savings accounts, the Federal
Reserve has included them in a second, broader transactions aggregate,
M-1B, rather than in M-1A.
Data considerations and judgments concerning possible properties of
demand for these accounts also argued for this approach. The accounts in
question were authorized so recently that historical data are insufficient
to permit seasonal adjustment of incoming data on them. In addition,
when the monetary aggregates were redefined, it appeared quite possible
that Congress would extend to depository institutions nationwide the au-
thority to issue NOW accounts; indeed, Congress later did so under Title
III of the Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act
of 1980. If NOW accounts were to attract funds from ordinary savings
accounts and other liquid assets, which are less versatile, then M-1B
would expand during a transition period at a rate well above the underly-
ing rate of growth of transactions balances.3 Thus, if M-1B were the only
published transactions balance measure, its growth rate might suggest to
the public that Federal Reserve policy is more expansionary than it truly
is. In sum, M-1A was designed to aid interpretation of seasonal and tran-
sitional variation in M-1B. It might be appropriate to eliminate M-1A
once the transition to nationwide NOW accounts is complete and histori-
cal data on the new savings accounts are sufficient for seasonal
adjustment.
33 NOW (negotiable order of withdrawal) savings accounts were authorized in stages at
depository institutions in New England, New York and New Jersey over the period from
June 1972 to December 1979. NOW accounts will become available nationwide on December
31, 1980.
34 ATS (automatic transfer service) savings accounts, from which funds are moved au-
tomatically into checking accounts as checks clear, were authorized in November 1978 at all
commercial banks and at thrift institutions already offering accounts transferable by draft.
31 Initial proposals by the Board staff to redefine the aggregates suggested this ap-
proach. See Board staff, A Proposal for Redefining the Monetary Aggregates, FED. RESERVE
BuLL. 13-42 (Jan. 1979).
38 M-1A, too, might exhibit transition effects. Its growth rate would understate the rate
of expansion of transactions balances if households shifted funds from demand deposits to
NOW accounts.
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Table 337
Estimated Annual Rates of Turnover for Selected Components
of the Monetary Aggregates
Estimated Annual
Turnover Rate
Demand deposits outside New York City 118.2
Consumer demand deposits 35.0
NOW accounts
Commercial banks 10.6
Thrift institutions 3 8  10.1
ATS, commercial banks 5.6
Money market mutual fund shares 2.8
Ordinary savings
Commercial banks 3.0
Mutual savings banks 3 9  1.7
F. Money Market Mutual Funds.
The public's ability to write drafts on accounts at most money mar-
ket mutual funds is often cited to support the inclusion of these funds in
the narrowest aggregate. However, the typical requirement that individ-
ual drafts exceed a rather large minimum amount limits the usefulness of
these funds as a medium of exchange.40 Moreover, the estimates of turno-
ver rates shown in Table 3 indicate that money market funds turn over
only about as quickly as ordinary savings accounts and much less rapidly
than any of the components of M-lB. Additional considerations, includ-
ing probable demand properties and data availability, argue for the place-
ment of these funds in a broader aggregate. First, movements of a narrow
aggregate that included these funds might be dominated by changes in
their attractiveness as investments when their yield changed relative to
yields on other assets. If so, the growth rate of such an aggregate would at
those times be a misleading indicator of the rate of expansion of funds
held for imminent transactions. 41 Second, cyclical behavior and the pub-
37 Data for September 1979, except for mutual savings bank savings accounts (October
1979), ATS accounts (June 1979), commercial bank NOW accounts (August 1979), and
money market mutual funds (November 1979).
11 Thrift institutions in New England.
39 Based on a sample of 25 mutual savings banks in New York State.
40 Most funds specify a minimum of $500 per draft. A few stipulate lower or higher
minima or do not offer check-writing privileges.
4'1 Econometric evidence-which, admittedly, may not foreshadow future develop-
ments-indicates that an aggregate consisting of M-1B and money market funds is not
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lic's gradual adjustment to the availability of money market funds have
thus far obscured the effects of seasonal variations in economic activity
on growth of these funds. For a time, therefore, the Federal Reserve will
be unable to adjust incoming data on money market funds for seasonal
influences. Without such adjustment, these funds would introduce more
seasonal variation, in percentage terms, to a narrow aggregate than to a
broad aggregate, like the new M-2, containing a greater volume of season-
ally adjusted components.42
G. Ordinary Savings Accounts and Small Time Deposits.
43
Consumers must convert ordinary savings balances and small time
deposits into media of exchange before they may use these funds for pay-
ment. According to the medium-of-exchange criterion, therefore, the nar-
row transactions aggregates should continue to exclude such deposits.
While savings deposits clearly are sufficiently liquid to be included in
M-2 along with money market mutual funds, the inclusion of small time
deposits in M-2 is questionable. Substantial interest penalties for early
withdrawal of small time deposits, together with their long average ma-
turity, tend to make them less liquid than the other components of M-2.
This relative illiquidity suggests that small time deposits are less closely
related to the public's spending plans than other elements of M-2 and,
thus, should be excluded from that aggregate.4" The Federal Reserve
nevertheless opted to include small time deposits in M-2 because
econometric evidence indicates that demand for M-2, with small time de-
posits included, is considerably more predictable than demand for an ag-
gregate consisting of all components of M-2 but small time deposits. In
addition, the latter aggregate has been somewhat less closely related to
GNP than the new M-2.
Under the old definitions, savings and small time deposits at banks
appeared in M-2, while those at thrift institutions appeared only in M-3
and broader aggregates. The new M-2 includes savings and small time
markedly superior to M-1B, on balance, with respect to demand properties and ability to
explain and to forecast growth of GNP.
42 This effect may partly account for the failure of M-1B plus money market funds to
exhibit notably better empirical properties than M-1B alone. See preceding footnote.
'3 Small time deposits are defined as those having denominations of less than $100,000.
The interest rates borne by these deposits, unlike those on larger time deposits, are subject
to regulatory ceilings.
" Indeed, for this reason, the Board staff initially recommended an M-2 measure in-
cluding savings deposits, but not small time accounts. See Board staff, supra note 35, at 13,
22.
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deposits at both banks and thrifts. This change in the definition of M-2
takes into account the fact that in recent years savings instruments at
thrifts have become better substitutes for those at commercial banks.4 5
The new procedure also reflects the fact that, as in the case of savings
instruments at banks, consumers tend to shift funds between savings in-
struments at thrifts and money market mutual funds in response to
changes in relative interest rates.
H. Security Repurchase Agreements.
The new aggregates, unlike the old, include security repurchase
agreements (RPs) issued to the nonbank public by commercial banks and
savings and loan associations.46 The new M-2 includes overnight and con-
tinuing contract RPs at banks. Term RPs at banks appear at the M-3
level because they are less liquid. M-3 also includes all RPs issued by
savings and loan associations. RPs issued by nonbank security dealers to
the nonbank public are not included in any aggregate. In principle, RPs
issued by savings and loan associations and nonbank security dealers
should be grouped with RPs of similar maturity at banks, but current
data limitations necessitate deviations from this approach.47
Several reasons have been suggested for including RPs, especially
overnight RPs, in a narrow aggregate designed to measure transactions
balances. First, the existence of fixed balance demand deposit accounts,
which afford automatic investment of excess funds in RPs at the end of
the business day, suggest that some funds available for spending during
4 Econometric evidence suggests that passbook savings accounts at mutual savings
banks and at savings and loans have in recent years become rather good substitutes for
those at commercial banks. Historical data does not indicate a similar improvement in the
overall substitutability of small time deposits at thrifts and banks. See W. Barnett, Eco-
nomic Monetary Aggregates: An Application of Index Number and Aggregation Theory, J.
OF ECONOMmMCS, (Sept. 1980, forthcoming). However, the econometric evidence on small
time deposits does not reflect the introduction in June 1978, of 6-month money market
certificates, which constitute a growing proportion of small time deposits. Relative rates of
growth of the volumes of such certificates outstanding at banks and thrifts have been quite
sensitive to changes in the difference between interest rates paid on the certificates at the
two types of institution. This observation suggests that money market certificates at thrifts
are good substitutes for those at banks.
4' RPs are lending arrangements in which the borrower simultaneously sells securities
to the lender and agrees to repurchase the securities at some future date at a specified,
higher price, which provides to the lender an interest return. The new aggregates include
RP agreements in which banks or savings and loans are borrowers. "Overnight" RPs are
those involving repurchase of securities on the next business day after sale. "Term" RPs are
those involving repurchase of securities on a fixed date more than one business day after
sale. "Continuing contract" RPs involve repurchase on any business day that either party
chooses.
' The volume of overnight and continuing contract RPs issued by savings and loans is
believed to be small.
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the day appear as RPs in bank records. Second, some econometric studies
conclude .that the rapid growth of RPs after mid-1974 explains much of
the shortfall of the public's demand for demand deposits below predicted
levels since that time.48
Exclusion of RPs from the narrowest aggregate appears justified by a
careful evaluation of the above arguments, as well as by data limitations
and possible demand properties. First, use of fixed balance accounts is
reported to be quite limited. Rather, firms usually arrange RPs early in
the day, so that most RPs represent funds that are not immediately avail-
able to finance transactions. Second, the econometric results mentioned
above do not imply that RPs are transactions balances. 49 Indeed, numer-
ous interviews with corporate cash managers suggest that they view RPs
not as interest-bearing demand deposits, available for disbursement at
any time, but rather as one of several low-risk, short-term investments
that complement demand deposits in cash management strategies." This
common view suggests that movements of a narrow aggregate containing
RPs might at times be dominated by changes in their attractiveness as
investments; the growth rate of such an aggregate would at those times be
a misleading indicator of the rate of growth of transactions balances. Fi-
nally, historical data are insufficient for reliable seasonal adjustment of
incoming data on overnight and continuing contract RPs; this problem
would complicate interpretation of growth of the aggregates to a lesser
extent if such RPs were included only in M-2 and broader aggregates.
I. Eurodollars.
In principle, the portion of Eurodollar deposits that is held by non-
banks for expenditure in the United States should be grouped with do-
mestic assets of similar term in the broader aggregates.51 Given its inabil-
ity to ascertain the intended use of Eurodollars, the Federal Reserve has
elected for now to include in the new aggregates only those Eurodollars
11 Tinsley, Garrett and Friar, The Measurement of Money Demand, BOARD OF GOVER-
NORS OF THE FEDERAL RESEVE SYSTEM, SPECIAL STUDIES PAPER NUMBER 133 (Oct. 1978), Gar-
cia and Pak, Some Clues in the Case of the Missing Money, 69 Am. ECONOMIC REV. 330-34
(May 1979).
49 Rather, RPs, whose growth accounts for only part of the recent shortfall in demand
for demand deposits, may be only one of several short-term investments to which corpora-
tions diverted funds as improvements in cash management practices reduced their need for
transactions balances. Board staff, supra note 35, at 17, and Porter, Mauskoff, and Simpson,
Financial Innovation and the Monetary Aggregates, 1 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECONoMIc Ac-
TwvrrY 213-229 (1979).
11 Davis, supra note 30.
51 Total Eurodollar deposits held by nonbanks are estimated by Board staff to have
equaled $161 billion as of June 1979.
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known to be held by nonbank residents of the United States.5 2 Overnight
Eurodollars issued by Caribbean branches of member banks are properly
grouped in M-2 with overnight RPs.5 3 It is conceptually appropriate to
include term Eurodollars in M-3, along with similar instruments, such as
term RPs. Term Eurodollars nevertheless appear as part of L, because
the data used to estimate their volume are available only with a relatively
long delay. This delay would have a greater impact on the timeliness of
M-3 than on that of L, because data on several other components of L are
available only with a long lag.
K. Large Time Deposits.
5 4
Large certificates of deposit appear in the new M-3 because they do
not seem to be good substitutes for the components of M-2. Their large
denominations-100,000 or more-make them inaccessible to most
owners of savings and small time accounts. Moreover, in terms of liquid-
ity and their function in corporate portfolios, large time deposits seem
more similar to term RPs (which are included in the new M-3, but not in
M-2) than to such very liquid assets as overnight RPs and overnight
Eurodollars, contained in the new M-2.
The old M-2 included large time deposits at commercial banks, other
than negotiable CDs at large banks. Some have argued for the continued
inclusion of large time deposits in M-2, on the grounds that the income
velocity of the old M-2 was relatively predictable. However, this desirable
quality may not have reflected properties of demand for the aggregate,
but rather a past tendency for banks as a group to rely on changes in
their issuance of large time deposits as an offset to changes in demand for
52 An alternative approach would be to include, in addition, Eurodollars held by non-
banks residing outside the United States, weighted by some index of the probability that
these funds would be spent in the United States, rather than abroad. One possible index is
the share of the United States in the world economy. See Wallich, Euro-markets and U.S.
Monetary Growth, J. OF COMMERCE, (May 1 and 8, 1979).
As better data become available, the Federal Reserve may give further consideration to
including Eurodollars held by foreign residents other than commercial banks and official
institutions.
" Some overnight Eurodollars that are issued to U.S. nonbank residents by bank offices
other than Caribbean branches of member banks are included only in L because current
data sources do not separate these overnight Eurodollars from term Eurodollars. These
overnight Eurodollars may eventually be included in M-2 if data flows improve.
In 1979, the volume of overnight Eurodollars nearly doubled from $2 billion to $3.9
billion at Caribbean branches of member banks that participated in a special survey by the
Federal Reserve.
" Negotiable large time deposits, which are commonly called certificates of deposit
(CDs), can be resold after purchase from a bank or thrift. Nonnegotiable large time depos-
its, like small time certificates, cannot be resold, but banks generally permit customers who
hold considerable amounts of nonnegotiable large certificates to convert them to negotiable
CDs at will.
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their other deposit liabilities. If banks alter their strategy, as they have
recently, shifting between large time deposits and other "managed" liabil-
ities as sources of funds, then the inclusion of large time deposits in M-2
will fail to make its velocity stable and predictable.5
J. Other Liquid Assets.
The broadest new aggregate, L, adds to M-3 other fairly liquid assets
held in substantial quantities by the nonbank public, namely term
Eurodollars, bankers acceptances, commercial paper, short-term Treasury
securities, and savings bonds. These assets are not subject to reserve re-
quirements. Therefore, while L is a more comprehensive measure of liq-
uid assets than the other aggregates, it is less controllable. Moreover, the
correlation between L and GNP likely results in large part from rela-
tively strong reverse causality-that is, from a strong influence of GNP
on L. Thus, the Federal Reserve System will emphasize the other, nar-
rower aggregates as targets for monetary policy.
K. Consolidation.
The old monetary definitions specified rather crude adjustments
designed to eliminate from the aggregates those assets held to service
items included in the official measures. As a result of these rough adjust-
ments, most of the old aggregates either understated or overstated con-
ceptually ideal monetary totals. Under the new definitions, consolidation
procedures have been refined to the extent that available data permit.56
V. CONCLUSION
The new official monetary aggregates appear to be considerably more
suitable than the old as foci for the future conduct of monetary policy.
55 For example, the income velocity of the old M-2 rose unexpectedly during the first
quarter of 1979, when banks responded to declines in demand and savings deposits by in-
creasing their issuance of nondeposit liabilities-mainly net liabilities to their branches
overseas-while reducing the rate of growth of large time deposits.
RPs, too, are managed liabilities. It is possible, therefore, that changes in banks' man-
agement strategies, involving greater or less reliance on overnight and continuing contract
RPs, will produce unexpected changes in the velocity of the new M-2. Nevertheless, the
relative liquidity of these instruments appears to justify their inclusion'in that aggregate.
" See BACH COMMrrPEE REPORT, supra note 19, at 12-14 for a detailed discussion of the
former consolidation procedures. See The Redefined Monetary Aggregates, FED. RESERVE
BuLL. 97-114 (Feb. 1980), for a description of the new consolidation procedures.
It is understood that the less-developed contracting parties must take into account their
individual development, financial and trade situation when selecting the particular measure
to be applied.
It is noted that such a finding is more likely to be made in the case of recent measures
than of measures in effect for some considerable time.
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The new money measures, unlike the old, include money market mutual
funds and RPs-liquid assets whose volume has grown rapidly in recent
years. Another important improvement is the inclusion of Eurodollars. By
appearing in the official aggregates, Eurodollars will now enter formally
into the determination of U.S. monetary policy. The new definitions, un-
like the old, take into account the differences between ordinary savings
deposits and NOW, ATS, and credit union share draft balances, as well as
the growing substitutability of deposits at commercial banks and thrift
institutions. Additional improvements include the prospective inclusion
of nonbank travelers checks, the removal of large time deposits from M-
2, and the refinement of consolidation procedures.
Nevertheless, the new official aggregates may not be satisfactory for
all purposes; researchers and private decision-makers, for instance, may
wish to construct alternative totals. Moreover, an examination of data on
the individual components of the aggregates and other financial assets,
such as deposits held by the U.S. Treasury, may aid interpretation and
forecasting of economic developments. The Federal Reserve will therefore
publish not only the aggregates, but also their main components and sev-
eral excluded items.
The new aggregates have been selected on the basis of judgments
concerning their prospective behavioral properties-judgments which
may prove incorrect. Furthermore, while the Depository Institutions De-
regulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980 provides for gradual relaxa-
tion and eventual elimination of limits on interest rates on consumer
deposits, removal of the other governmental restrictions discussed in
Section II is not in prospect. As long as these restrictions remain in force,
they will enhance the likelihood of additional financial innovations that
might impair the usefulness of the new measures of money. Thus, while
the recent redefinition of the aggregates appears to be a valuable step,
further redefinition may eventually prove desirable.
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